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CASE NOTES
AGENCY
Glidewell v. S. C Management, 923 S. W.2d 940 (Mlo. Ct. App. 1996).
The Court of Appeals for the Southern District of Missouri held a
plaintiff's settlement with a physician did not release the hospital from
liability where the physician was an agent of the hospital a vicariously
liable hospital could only be exonerated if found not liable by the fact
finder. The court further held that a jury could reasonably infer that an
agency relationship existed between the physician and the hospital where
the hospital recruited the physician and paid the physician's salary and
expenses.
ANTITRUST
Hefner v. Caremark, 918 P.2d 595 (Idaho 1996). The Supreme Court
of Idaho held that a prescription drug reimbursement plan violated a state
antitrust statute. The court determined that plaintiff pharmacies
demonstrated a contract between defendant pharmacies and defendant
providers which resulted in anticompetitive effects.
Martin v. Memorial Hosp. at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391 (5th Cir. 1996).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held a government
owned hospital to be immune from an antitrust claim brought by a
physician who contended the hospital's exclusive contract with another
physician to run one of the hospital's facilities was a violation of antitrust
laws. The court determined that under state law the hospital was a
subdivision of the state or a municipal corporation and was entitled to
exclusive contracts. Therefore, all the hospital needed to show was that
it acted pursuant to a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state
policy." The court determined that this requirement could be met if the
hospital showed a statutory scheme demonstrating the state legislature
clearly contemplated the anticompetitve conduct.
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CERTJFICATE OF NEED
Depeartment Of Public Health v. Rivergate Manor and Senior Servs.
Development Assocs., 550 N. W.2d 515 (Mich. 1996). The Supreme
Court of Michigan held the State Department of Health (Department)
could deny modification of a nursing home's certificate of need (CON)
which was improperly issued by the Certificate of Need Board (Board) if
the Board exceeded its authority by approving what was essentially a new
CON. The court found that the Board lacked authority to modify the
CON, because the it was site specific and non-transferable. Further, the
court found the Board had approved modification of the nursing home's
CON after the nursing home had already been denied approval of the
certificate by the Department.
DAMAGES
Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508 (Ga. CL App. 1996). The Court of
Appeals of Georgia held a patient who feared she contracted human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) after a nurse accidentally punctured her
with a non-sterile hypodermic needle could not recover emotional distress
damages from the nurse or hospital. Because there was no evidence of
actual exposure to HV, the court found there was no causal connection
between the nurse's act and the damages which the patient allegedly
suffered. Therefore, the patient's claim for fear and mental anguish was
unreasonable as a matter of law.
Klein v. Children's Hosp. Med Cr. ofN Cal, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34, (Cal.
Ct App. 1996). The California Court of Appeal, First District, Division
Five, denied recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
parents whose child was misdiagnosed by physicians. The court found that
since the distress was caused by apprehension for the child's health, rather
than the plaintiffs' own health, the hospital was insulated from suit.
Williamson v. Waldman, 677 A.2d 1179 (NJ. Super. Ct App. Div.
1996). The Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, held that an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, brought against a
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medical office by a cleaning employee who suffered puncture wounds from
a lancet while cleaning that office, should not have been dismissed on
summary judgment. The court found the employee did not need to show
actual exposure to a feared disease in order to recover damages for
emotional distress, and did not act unreasonably even though she had
tested negative for hepatitis and HIV five times over a three and half year
period since the incident.
DISABILITY
Tennessee Dep't of Mental Health and Mfental Retardation v. Paul B.,
Hamilton County Bd of Ed, 88 F.3d 1466 (6th Cir. 1996). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed summary judgment
that would have required the State Department of Mental Health and
Mental Retardation (Department) to pay for all costs associated with a
seriously emotionally disturbed student's stay at a residential therapeutic
group home. The court recognized that the Department had failed to
inform the students's parents that under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) "stay put" provision, the student could have
remained at the residential group home while the parents' appealed a
recommendation to move the child into a day placement. However, the
court held that summary judgment was inappropriate, because there was
a material issue of fact as to whether the parents would have successfully
argued, as required under the "stay put" provision, that treatment in a
residential therapeutic group home was necessary to meet the student's
educational needs.
Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, 93 F. 3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that an employee
suffering from bipolar and anxiety disorders failed to establish a disability
discrimination claim under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
court found an employee was not entitled to recovery under the ADA
where employee failed to appraise employer of any limitations resulting
from disability and any need for reasonable accommodations based on
those limitations.
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Pham v. Shalala, No. C-94-20745-JW, 1996 WL 411603 (N.D. Cal.
July 16, 1996). The United States District Court for the Northem District
of California denied Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits under
the Social Security Act to applicant who failed to (1) follow a prescribed
course of medical treatment, (2) demonstrate a physical impairment that
would prohibit engaging in substantial gainful activity and would be
expected to last for more than twelve months, and (3) complain of any
symptoms or seek treatment for a mental impairment which constituted
more than depression, and which could be treated with medication.
Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, 87 F.3d 755 (5th Cir. 1996).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that a
former employee with surgically correctable ankle difficulties- did not meet
the requirements of a "qualified individual with a disability" under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) because the employee's physical
impairment was neither chronic nor severe enough to substantially limit his
daily activities. Moreover, under the reasonable accommodation provision
of the ADA, the employer was not required to wait indefinitely for the
employee to return to work following surgery and was, therefore, justified
in terminating the employee during a planned work force reduction for
prior absenteeism and unavailability.
Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Case Western Reserve Univ., 666
N.E.2d 1376 (Ohio 1996). The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed a
medical school's decision to deny admission to a blind applicant and found
the school did not violate a state statute which proscribed handicap
discrimination in education. The court held that testimony of a blind
graduate of medical school was neither probative, nor substantial, in
demonstrating that a blind applicant would be able to safely and sufficiently
perform the requirements of the medical school's program with
"reasonable accommodations." The court concluded the medical school
did not have a duty to investigate technological advances to assist the blind
if it denied the blind individual's application for admission based on a bona
fide standard for admission to the school.
Duffy v. Riveland, 88 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir. 1996). The United States
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's decision
to dismiss a deaf inmate's Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act actions brought against a state reformatory for failure
to provide a qualified interpreter. Because both the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act prohibit state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,
the appeals court found that the district court erred as a matter of law in
dismissing the suit, and held that the inmate presented valid questions of
fact as to whether an interpreter was qualified.
Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1996). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected an employee's Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) action against his former employer after he
was terminated. The court reasoned that the employee's mere inability to
do a particular job or discrete task, such as lifting heavy objects, did not
constitute a substantial limitation in a major life activity. Therefore, the
employee was unable to satisfy the requisite "disability" under the ADA.
Comstock v. Charter, 91 F.3d 1143 (8th Cir. 1996). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that an impaired individual did
not qualify as "disabled" under the Social Security Act, because the
individual was engaged in "substantial gainful employment" as a gas station
attendant earning at least $300/week and participating in some physical
and/or mental work. In reaching its decision, the court relied on objective
medical testimony that the individual's impairments did not constitute a
"disability" and finding the individual's work activity belied his claim of
disabling pain.
DUTY TO WARN
Safer v. Pack, 677A. 2d 1188 (NJ. Super. Ct App. Din 1996). The
Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, ruled that a physician
has a duty to notify immediate family members who may have been
adversely affected by the genetic transmission of an avoidable medical
condition. A plaintiff inflicted with cancerous blockage and multiple
polyposis brought this professional negligence action against the estate of
a physician who had previously treated the plaintiff's father for a similar
1996]
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condition. The plaintiff argued that the physician's knowledge of the
genetically transmitted condition in the plaintiff's father imposed a
professional duty upon the physician to warn the family members of their
own risks of contracting the disease. As a result of this failure to warn,
plaintiff's condition went undetected and untreated, thereby requiring
extensive surgery and chemotherapy to remove the cancer. Plaintiff
claimed that the physician knew about the hereditary element of the
condition, and was required by prevailing medical standards to inform
plaintiff and the patient's immediate family of their own risks.
The court recognized a prevailing standard of care which created
a duty to benefit certain third parties. Therefore, the physician was
required to notify those third parties if identifiable. Prior case law in the
state held that notifying the patient of the hereditary element was sufficient
in that the patient was expected to pass the information on to his/her
family. However, the court stated that no legal impediment existed to
recognizing a physician's duty to warn those posed with a genetic
condition. The court reasoned that early monitoring of genetic diseases
may effectively avert more serious disease related repercussions and
therefore, some duty to warn was appropriate. Although no Strict standard
was developed by the court, it requires reasonable steps be taken to assure
beneficial information is readily available to those at risk, namely a
patient's immediate family.
ERISA
Ravenscraft v. Hy-Vee Employee Benefit Plan and Trust, 85 F.3d 398
(8th Cir. 1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found that absent contrary contractual commitments, an employer
may unilaterally modify or terminate health benefits without violating the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), and is not subject to
judicial review for abuse of discretion. The court held that since ERISA
does not provide a right for benefits under an employee welfare benefit
plan, an employer does not act as an ERISA fiduciary in adopting or
amending such a plan, and employers can modify health benefits provided
that such a modification is not arbitrary or capricious.
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Godfrey v. BellSouth Telecommunications, 89 F.3d 755 (11th Cir.
1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found
for an employee who brought an action against her employer under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) seeking to enforce
provisions of her sickness and disability benefits plans. The court held that
the employee was entitled to relief because her employer's decision to deny
benefits was arbitrary and capricious and a conflict of interest existed. In
addition, the court found the employer violated ERISA's anti-retaliation
provision by threatening to discharge and actually disciplining the
employee for staying home, when under the benefits plan the employee had
a right to do so.
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare
Fund v. Neurobehavioral Assoc., 1996 WL 392153 (N.D. Ill July 11,
1996). The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),
trustees of a Health and Welfare Plan (Plan) have no authority to reverse
decisions granting benefits to plan beneficiaries once the benefits have
already been paid out. Moreover, overpayments made to a medical
provider may constitute unjust enrichment when authorization for payment
has been denied under ERISA, which provides that constructive denial
occurs after ninty days.
EVIDENCE
Carrico v. Secretary of Health and Human Senices, 1996 WL 422146
(Fed C July 12, 1996). The United States Federal Court of Claims held
that parents petitioning for compensation under the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 had the burden of showing that measles
vaccine caused their child's death. The court found that the parents failed
to meet their burden, because they did not show by a preponderance of the
medical evidence that the measles vaccine was the true cause of their
child's death, and therefore, the court dismissed the parents' petition with
prejudice.
1996]
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Krisfin H. v. Kimberly L, 54 Cal Rptr.2d 722 (CaL C4 App. 1996). The
California Court of Appeal held that a court has jurisdiction over a child
in ajuvenile dependency proceeding where the mother's psychologist and
psychiatrist both found the mother was in crisis, and where her physicians
testified that the mother's drug use exacerbated her condition and impaired
her already poorjudgment. Reviewing the decision on a "sufficiency of the
evidence" standard, the court found that the lower court properly asserted
jurisdiction where evidence established its finding that the child would
suffer serious harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of the
mother to adequately supervise or protect the child, due to the mother's
mental illness or substance abuse.
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
Harrison v. Children's Nat'l Meda Cr., 678 A.2d 572 (D. C 1996). The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the sixteen-week protected
period under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) includes both
paid and unpaid sick leave and is the absolute maximum time that an
employee may be away from work on medical leave. The court found the
discharge of a former employee after she was absent fiom work for
medical reasons for more than seventeen weeks was not a violation of the
FMLA and rejected the employee's contention that her use of four weeks
of previously earned paid "sick leave" should not have been counted in
calculating the FMLA's protected period of unpaid "medical leave." In its
first interpretation of the FMLA, the court strictly construed "medical
leave" as any leave taken for medical reasons, including any leave taken
when an employee cannot work because of a "serious health condition."
IMMUNITY
Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624 (3d Ci. 1996). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that hospitals are
immune from liability under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
(HCQIA) where it undertakes a professional review activity and where the
plaintiff, a physician, fails to prove the review process was unreasonable.
The court reasoned that peer review actions, when properly conducted,
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generally enhance competition and improve the quality of medical care.
INFORMED CONSENT
Wecker v. Amend, 918 P.2d 658 (Kan. Ct App. 1996). The Court of
Appeals of Kansas held that an attending physician must inform surgical
patients of the option of choosing no treatment when such a choice is a
medically acceptable alternative. The court found that a patient's
testimony that she would not have undergone surgery had she been aware
of the option of foregoing such treatment, was relevant to show causation
in a negligence suit.
INSURANCE
Brown v. JMICLife Ins Co., 474 S.E.2d 645 (Ga. Ct App. 1996). The
Georgia Court of Appeals found that failure to tell a perspective new
insurance company about medication being taken for a year to treat a
circulatory disease, was considered to be a misrepresentation of fact. The
state code provides protection to insurance companies against
misrepresentation, omissions, and concealment of facts by recognizing the
right to void a policy that has been granted on the basis of one of these
grounds. The court reasoned that prescription medicine was considered
treatment for a disease, and had the insurance company known about the
newly insured's treatment and disease, it would have denied coverage.
Fath v. Unum Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 1147 (M.D. Fla. 1996). The
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida held that a
disability is "pre-existing" where symptoms existed before the effective
date of the insurance policy, and where there was no plain language in the
policy requiring a diagnosis of the illness before the effective date, none
was required.
Greater New York Mut Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 85 F.3d 1088
(3d Cir. 1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that two-tiered settlements, in which an insured settles with the excess
insurer and allows it to pursue the primary insurer, are permitted under
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state law. Additionally, the court held that when a primary insurer acts in
bad faith by refusing to settle a personal injury claim, an excess insurer
may, as the injured party's subrogee, sue the primary insurer for its bad
faith.
United Services Automobile Assoc v. Perry, 92 F.3d 295 (5tih Cir. 1996).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
United Services Automobile Association (USAA) provided a form of no-
fault insurance and was, therefore, liable under federal statute to the United
States government for reimbursement of medical costs incurred in treating
soldiers who were insured by USAA in military hospitals. In reaching its
conclusion, the court found the term "no-fault insurance carrier," as it
appears in the relevant federal statute, refers to any insurance contracts
that provide medical payments or similar types of coverage, regardless of
fault.
Westchester Advocates for Disabled Adults v. Potaki, 931 F. Supp. 993
(ED.N Y 1996). The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York held the state was required to offer in-state
institutionalization and schooling for disabled people who were
beneficiaries of a state program that was designed to provide a bridge
between educational programs for severely disabled persons under twenty-
one years old, and long-term adult residential care. The court held that if
no in-state institutionalization was suitable for the beneficiary, due process
required the state to furnish out-of-state care. The court also found that
adequate notice had to be given to the disabled person's family if any
changes in institutionalization were to take place.
FDA
Berish v. Richards Medical Co., 928 F. Supp. 185 (N.D.N. Y. 1996). The
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York found
that a prosthesis classified as an "investigational device exception" (IDE)
under the Medical Device Act (MDA) preempted strict liability,
negligence, and express and implied warranty claims for alleged defect in
the system. The device in question received the EDE prior to the plaintiff's
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surgery and the court found that the device was subject to an IDE as a
matter of law and, theref6re, the state tort claims were preempted.
Likewise, the state law claim for negligent manufacture was preempted,
since there was federal law in conflict with state law, and Congress had
"filled the field." Further, the court determined that the IDE was not
nullified even thought the physician who actually performed the surgery
was not a part of the investigational device study.
LABOR
Presbyterian Univ. Hosp. v. NLRB, 88 F.3d 1300 (3d Cir. 1996). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit supported the
National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) finding that a multi-facility
health care center committed unfair labor practices when it refused to
bargain with its skilled maintenance employees' union, which recently
added telecommunication workers. The court recognized special concerns
regarding the undue proliferation of bargaining units in the health care
industry, and held the NLRB did not abuse its discretion when it
determined the existing skilled maintenance union could include
telecommunication workers by a self-determination election, and did not
have to include other non-unionized skilled maintenance employees
working at various facilities within the health care center.
LICENSE REVOCATION
Brigham v. De Buono, 664 N. Y.S. 2d 413 (N. Y. App. Din 1996). The
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, ruled against defendant
physician in a negligence suit associated with the performance of two late
term abortions. Physician failed to recognize the extent and severity of a
laceration which occurred during a dilation and evacuation (D&E)
procedure, and also failed to transfer the patient to a hospital upon
subsequent notice of the laceration.
Defendant challenged the professional medical conduct violations
as well as the revocation of his medial license due to those violations.
Primarily, the physician neither counseled the patients in regards to the
psychological impacts of an abortion, nor the health risks posed by a late
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second-term abortion. In further violation, the physician did not have a
transfer arrangement with another physician possessing hospital privileges
in the case of an emergency. Instead, the physician was forced to rely on
911 emergency telephone service when complications arose. Thirdly, the
physician was cited for a "limited scope of visualization" w,.th respect to
one patient, who experts testified was a poor D&E candidate originally.
Further, defendant continued the abortion even after the discovery of a
laceration in the uterine segment of that patient, discovery of which
required immediate transfer to a hospital.
The physician was penalized for his negligence by revocation of his
medical license; however, he claimed this penalty was eKcessive and
overbroad. The court ruled, nevertheless, that due to the physician's poor
sense of patient evaluation, and the poor judgment of his own abilities, a
rehabilitative sanction would have been inappropriate and too lenient.
Therefore, considering the extent and seriousness of the injuries inflicted
upon the two patients, the court upheld the license revocation as
appropriate.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Ganapolskaya v. V.LP. MedicalAssocs., 644 N. Y.S.2d 735 (N. Y. App.
Div. 1996). The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Department held that the continuous treatment doctrine tolled the two and
one-half year limitations period on medical malpractice actions while the
plaintiff received emergency treatment in another medical ficility for the
condition created by defendant physicians' alleged malpractice. The court
found that a strong nexus between medical facilities existed where it was
clear that, at the time of emergency transfer, defendants' treatment had not
been completed and that transfer was for plaintiff to undergo further
medical procedures to correct defendants' alleged malpractice. Finally, the
court held that in the presence of an agency relationship or some other
relevant association, such as further treatment for the original condition or
complaint which continues the nexus between the two medical providers,
the continuing treatment by one will be imputed to the other to toll the
running of the limitations period until the course of treatment ends.
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Pendleton v. Barret4 675 So. 2d 720 (La. 1996). The Supreme Court of
Louisiana denied a State Patient Compensation Fund's motion to require
plaintiff patient to prove a causal connection between the physician's
admitted malpractice and the original harm suffered by the patient. The
court found that the settlement between the physician and the plaintiff
established this connection. The court further held that the district court
should determine whether any secondary damages were encompassed in
the physician's duty of care, and if so the plaintiff should be required to
establish a causal connection between the malpractice and the secondary
damages.
MEDICARE / MEDICAID
Good Samaritan Hosp. Regional ledical Ctr. v. Shalala, 85 F.3d 1057
(2nd Cir. 1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held tliat not-for-profit hospitals which are health service providers
under the Medicare Act, are not entitled to have their Medicare claims
from previous years reopened by the fiscal intermediary from which they
received reimbursement so that the claims might be increased. The court
found that hospitals can not seek review of a fiscal intermediary's ruling
not to reopen by a Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB),
because the PRRB lacks jurisdiction to review the fiscal intermediary's
final determination as to the amount of a reimbursement claim.
Cupey Bajo Nursing Home v. United States, No. 685-89C, 1996 WJL
343069 (C CZ, June 24, 1996). The United States Court of Federal
Claims denied a nursing home reimbursement for alleged underpayment for
cost of performance in a government contract action. In a counterclaim,
the court ordered the home to reimburse the government for an
overpayment of services during the same year. The court calculated a "per
diem" rate under the contract by looking to the total number of "inpatient
service days," and decreased the amount of reimbursement by eliminating
expressly unallowable expenses.
Skyview-Hazelde v. Idaho Dep't OfHealth and Welfare, 918 P.2d 1201
(Idaho 1996). The Supreme Court of Idaho held that a nursing facility
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which exceeded a state statutory Medicaid percentile cap had the burden
of proving it was efficiently operated and that its costs were reasonable.
The court held that to prove reasonableness, the nursing facility must
produce evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that
some of its costs were beyond its control, and must also present more than
two witnesses and a nonaffiliated nurse to give general and conclusory
testimony.
MENTAL HEALTH
Waters v. C W., 552 N. W.2d 382 (N.D. 1996). The Supreme Court of
North Dakota held a patient may be subject to an involuntary treatment
order when there is clear and convincing evidence the patient is mentally
ill or chemically dependent, and there is a reasonable expectation that the
patient poses a serious risk of harm to herself or others if left untreated.
The court found that when the choice is between involuntarily treating a
patient with drugs which could stabilize the patient and allow an early
release from hospitalization, and not medicating the patient at all which
could cause a deterioration in condition and lead to indefinite
hospitalization, forced medication is permissible as the least restrictive
form of treatment. The court also emphasized that showing im immediate
risk of harm is not necessarily required to prove that an untreated patient
can pose a "serious risk" of harm.
Kulak v. City ofNew York, 88 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 1996). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld a psychiatrist's decision to
have a patient who threatened to kill his parents and sister involuntarily
confined and medicated. The court determined that a patient did not have
a liberty interest in a less restrictive setting where he suffered from mental
illness and posed a substantial risk of harm to himself or others. Moreover,
the court determined a psychiatrist's decision to medicate was a proper
exercise of professional judgment and comported with state statutory
requirements.
Noble v. Schmidt, 87F.3d157 (6th Cir. 1996). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that employees of a state mental
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health facility could not use qualified immunity as an affirmative defense to
allegations of improper use of restraints brought by a patient who alleged
that employees violated his established Constitutional rights. The court
recognized that patient's have a liberty interest in being free from bodily
restraint, and a right to refuse medical treatment. Therefore, restraints
should not be used to control a patient's violent outbursts unless the
patient poses a threat to himself or others.
Westchester Advocates for DisabledAdults v Potaki, No. CIV.A. CV-96-
0930 (DG), 1996 WL 363139 (E.D.N. Y., June 17, 1996). The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held the state
was required to offer in-state institutionalization and schooling for disabled
people who were beneficiaries of a state program that was designed to
provide a bridge between educational programs for severely disabled
persons under twenty-one years old, and long-term adult residential care.
The court held that if no in-state institutionalization was suitable for the
beneficiary, due process required the state to furnish out-of-state care. The
court also found that adequate notice had to be given to the disabled
person's family if any changes in institutionalization were to take place.
NEGLIGENCE
Irizany v. Corporation Insular De Seguros, 928 F. Supp. 141 (D. Puerto
Rico 1996). The United States District Court for the District of Puerto
Rico held that a patient could not prevail in a negligence suit against his
physician by merely showing that another physician would have chosen to
treat him in a different manner than that chosen by the defendant physician.
The court held that in order to succeed in his negligence claim a patient's
evidence must be sufficient to show alleged fault and damages are more
than mere hindsight possibility, and the physician's negligence is the main
and probable cause of the patient's injuries.
PATERNITY
Witbeck-Wildhagen v. Wildhagen, 667 N.E.2d 122 (1iL App. Ct 1996).
The Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District, held that the husband in
1996]
JOURAAL OF HEAL TH CARE LA W
a marriage dissolution action was not the legal father of a child conceived
by artificial insemination because the husband had not consented to the
artificial insemination as required under state statute. The court held that
under state statute a husband's written consent is required prior to each
artificial insemination procedure, and because the husband in this case did
not give his consent, written or otherwise, the court refused to impose
child support obligations upon him and found a constitutional right not to
be deemed the father of a child he played no part in conceiving.
PATIENT DUMPiNG
James v. Sunrise Hosp., 86 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1996). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that in order to state a cause
of action under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), a plaintiff must show that a hospital determined patient's
condition to be an emergency condition and violated transfer restrictions
under the Act by discharging before patient's condition was stabilized.
The court stated that the transfer restrictions under EMTALA apply only
to an individual with an emergency condition, and not to one simply
physically present in the hospital.
PRIVILEGE
Jaffe v. Redmond, 116S. Ct 1923 (1996). The United States Supreme
Court held that a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege should be
recognized and applied to conversations between patients and their
therapists or licensed social workers during counseling sessions, and would
be protected from compelled disclosure under the Rules of Evidence.
Jaffe v. Redmond, 116 S.OC. 1923 (U.S. 1996). The United States
Supreme Court held that confidential communications between a
psychotherapist and a patient were privileged. The Court rejected a
balancing test that weighed the patient's privacy interests against the
evidentiary need for the disclosure of information and reasoned that an
"atmosphere of confidence and trust" was necessary for effective
psychotherapy and that without the privilege, communication between
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psychotherapist and patient would be "sufficiently chilled" such that
valuable evidentiary information would not even come into being. The
Court further held that the psychotherapist privilege covered confidential
communications made to licensed psychiatrists and psychologists as well
as licensed social workers in the course of psychotherapy.
Hayes v. State, 667 N.E.2d 222 (Ind Ct App. 1996). The Court of
Appeals of Indiana held that a therapist who reported a patient's
molestation of a child did not violate the therapist-client privilege because
the privilege was abrogated by state statute, the purpose of which was to
promote the reporting of child abuse and neglect cases. The court further
held that a molested child did not have to report abuse to have the statute
apply, but that any individual including an employer-employee or husband-
wife can report alleged abuse. Finally, the court found that because the
therapist was not a state actor, the patient's statements were properly
admitted and the patient's rights were not violated under Miranda.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902 (11th Cir. 1996). The
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the statute of
limitations barred tort actions brought by adoptive parents against an
adoption agency for delivering severely mentally and physically retarded
infants which the agency had represented as healthy. The court determined
that the parents' allegations regarding the adoption agency's deliberate
misrepresentations should have been brought under a breach of contract
theory or pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO).
TORTS
Tanner v. Hartog, 678 So.2d 1317 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 996). The District
Court of Appeals of Florida, Second District, affirmed dismissal of a
father's claims for loss of consortium and emotional damages based on
destruction of his living tissue, negligent stillbirth and having witnessed the
stillbirth of his fetus. The court held that the father could not recover
1996]
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under the tort of destruction of living tissue because the fetus was not part
of the father's body. In addition, the court found that the father's negligent
stillbirth claim for emotional damages could not be sustained because the
father's emotional distress did not flow from any physical injury.
WORKER'S COMPENSATION
Maginn v. N.D. Worker's Compensation Bureau, 550 N. W.2d 412 (N.D.
1996). The Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed a Worker's
Compensation Bureau's order discontinuing an employee's disability and
rehabilitation benefits because she failed to make a good :Faith effort in
offered employment. Using a "preponderance of the evidence" standard,
the court reviewed and refused to overturn the Bureau's finding that the
employee, who suffered a lumbar sprain, was physically capable of
performing the modified position offered by the employer.
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